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Abstract  
This article pursues overlapping points about ontology, philosophical method, and our kinship 
with and difference from nonhuman animals. The ontological point is that being is determinately 
different in different places not because of differences, or even a space, already given in advance, 
but in virtue of a negative in being that is regional and rooted in place, which Merleau-Ponty 
calls the “hollow.” The methodological point is that we tend to miss this ontological point 
because we are inclined to what I call transportable thinking, which conceives of things and 
spatial determinacy itself as being what they are independent of where they are. I argue that we 
are inclined this way because, in contrast to other animals, we have a weak sense of where we 
are. We are lost animals. To compensate for lostness, we abstract ourselves from place and 
conceptualize ourselves and things by way of a transportable, Cartesian “view from above.”  
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Being is determinately different in different 
places—it is diverse. This article develops a 
point about the ontology of diversity by 
studying phenomena of animal navigation 
and embryogenesis. The point is that the 
diversity of being is engendered by 
something regional, rooted in place, in virtue 
of what Merleau-Ponty calls a “hollow” in 
being, that is, a generative openness endog-
enous to the spread of being. Diversity is not 
generated by being as an already given 
plenum that is one and the same everywhere, 
such that being is everywhere informed by 
or contains non-regional, universal ideas or 
laws that can already actively specify or 
generate diversity. Rather, it is in virtue of 
not being all given and in virtue of this non-
givenness being passive to being’s inherent, 
regionalizing spread—to the “transspatial,”2 
as Merleau-Ponty puts it—that being 
engenders diversity. Diversity is thus 
reciprocal with place.  
To say that being is hollow, non-given, is 
not to say that being is purely void or empty: 
the very hollow of being inherently opens 
sense.3 The hollow is a negativity that gives 
being direction. But the hollow is precisely 
what Merleau-Ponty conceives as a 
negativity in being, and it eludes reduction 
to anything positively given. So diversity 
involves a genesis of differences from 
differences that are yet to be determined. 
The ‘not-yetness’ of the hollow is 
philosophically important in that its 
operation is not merely temporal (as in 
Derridean différance), but also importantly 
transspatial (here there is a resonance with 
Heideggerian Abgrund).4
 
Yet, as I suggest 
below, the sort of animal that we are and the 
sort of experience of spatiality that we 
thence have inclines us to miss this 
transspatial hollowness of being and model 
the determinacy-engendering power of being 
on, for example, rational laws or on our 
internal experience of temporality.5 
Here we arrive at a nexus in which 
ontology, method, and our relation to and 
difference from other animals mutually 
inform and illuminate one another. This 
nexus is central to the article’s spiralling 
path, so I begin by introducing it in two 
steps. First, I trace a point about Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophical method as it intersects 
with and leads him to the study of animals. 
Second, I introduce an ontological and 
conceptual point central to all that follows, 
namely, that our language, tradition, and 
bodies gear us to asking questions about 
what things are, as if things are substances 
that are what they are, independent of where 
they are. This kind of question involves 
what I call transportable thinking (or, 
correlatively, substance thinking). In 
contrast, what I call placed thinking 
conceives things as regional functions of 
places.6 Grasping the fact that diversity has 
its genesis in a transspatial hollow of being 
entails and involves a shift from 
transportable to placed thinking.  
Both this shift and the concept of a 
transspatial hollow in being are motivated 
by studying the development of hydra 
embryos, and then studying how sea turtles 
navigate across thousands of kilometers 
back to their home beaches. The strategy 
here is to have animal being—including our 
animal being—give ‘insider testimony’ to 
the way being goes. The conceptual point of 
the study of sea turtle navigation is drawn 
out by way of a contrast between Western 
and Micronesian experiences of navigation, 
and a contrast between the navigational 
ability of human animals and other animals. 
These contrasts loop back to the point that it 
is our way of being animal—our being a 
‘lost animal’ weakly tuned to place—that 
inclines us to transportable thinking. I sug-
gest that this also inclines us to Cartesian 
dualisms: to conduct ourselves in relative 
abstraction from specific places or points of 
view is to already displace ourselves from 
our worldly, bodily, animal being and to 
tend to what Merleau-Ponty calls “thinking 
from above.” The concluding thought is that 
we human animals are different from other 
animals not by way of having a 
fundamentally different faculty or kind of 
being, but precisely by way of a “weakness” 
of our animal being. That is, we are different 
from other animals precisely by way of what 
Merleau-Ponty calls our “strange kinship” 
with animals.7
 
We are different from other 
animals in not quite being able to follow 
them.8 
In developing this point about the hollow 
of being, I take myself to be pursuing 
something Merleau-Ponty had been working 
out across his career, in particular in his later 
lectures on nature (LN), and institution and 
passivity (IP).9 And I am doing so through 
methodological strategies learned from 
Merleau-Ponty. But the path and steps I take 
are different from MerleauPonty’s.  
 
Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Animality  
 
Merleau-Ponty often seeks clues to 
philosophical problems, for example, about 
perception, by studying animals. This 
strategy stems from his commitment to 
phenomenology as tuning concepts to the 
phenomena, rather than cutting the 
phenomena to fit already presumed and 
perhaps prejudiced theoretical frameworks. 
Undoing such presumptions or prejudices is 
difficult because some run so deep they are 
barely noticed. Studying animals helps 
temper this difficulty. Animals (including 
ourselves) inform us about being from 
within: an animal’s way of being offers 
clues as to the way being operates, in 
advance of our concepts. This helps us undo 
conceptual prejudices and develop new 
concepts.10 
But Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is not 
merely about animals. This is because his 
‘animal strategy’ is driven by an increasing 
radicalization of the phenomenological 
method, which radicalization displaces the 
agency of the phenomenologist into nature 
and being.11
 
To the degree that the 
phenomenologist operates as if purely active 
from within, she or he is liable to 
misdescribe phenomena.12 The philosopher 
should then seek things that, as it were, 
insistently describe themselves. She or he 
should let descriptions passively well up in 
him or herself, through a passivity—
specifically, here, an animality—en-
dogenous to philosophical activity. Thus 
Merleau-Ponty claims that “the only means 
to think Nature is by means of perceived 
nature” (LN 278/214). Not only must we 
find our concepts in nature itself, not ‘in our 
heads,’ we must operate with nature, in 
nature, to find these concepts.  
This point about thinking nature by means 
of perceived nature (which appears in 
reflections on the relation between 
philosophy and nature in the third nature 
course) echoes in some remarks about 
Schelling in the first nature course. There he 
writes that “we rediscover Nature in our 
perceptual experience prior to reflection” 
and that “perception teaches us an ontology 
that it alone can reveal to us” (LN 63–64/39–
40). These remarks startle because they are 
about Schelling but sound like remarks 
about Merleau-Ponty. Moreover, Merleau-
Ponty’s Schelling study appears in a section 
on the romantic conception of nature, which 
oddly includes Bergson and Husserl. But for 
Merleau-Ponty, Bergson, and Husserl (who 
are key inspirations) echo Schelling’s 
romantic conception of nature insofar as 
they find the beginning point of philosophy 
not in an idea actively constituted within us, 
but in some moment of reality or intuition in 
nature itself that testifies to the way things 
go. Schelling, Bergson, Husserl—and 
Merleau-Ponty—all seek to begin phi-
losophy from a point somewhat passive to 
and inside nature.13 Hence Merleau-Ponty’s 
methodological effort, in The Visible and the 
Invisible,14
 
to install philosophy back in 
being so as to interrogate being from within, 
and his effort in the institution lectures to 
conceptualize philosophy as an institution 
arising from prior institutions of history, 
culture, maturation, and animality. Just as 
the painter reveals something 
metaphysically significant by “taking his 
body with him,”15 thereby letting him paint 
and interrogate being from within, we could 
say that for Merleau-Ponty the philosopher 
must take along her or his animality if she or 
he is to properly interrogate being from 
within. Here again, we reach a nexus of 
ontology, method, and our relation to other 
animals: to get being right, we have to get 
our animal being right.  
This nexus reflects a substantive point in 
Merleau-Ponty, namely, that across his 
philosophical development he seeks sense 
not in constituting consciousness but in 
structure, perception, and ultimately, being. 
In the beginning of the first nature course, 
this point is captured in his definition of 
nature as “what has a sense, without this 
sense being posited by thought. It [nature] is 
the autoproduction of a sense” (LN 19/3). 
Animals are nodes in nature as the 
autoproduction of sense: their very being is 
to mobilize and make themselves visible as 
nodes of sense production. In their 
coloration, embryogenesis, and so on (which 
Merleau-Ponty studies in LN), animals show 
us how they make sense and make sense of 
nature. Animals thus manifest the sense-
making of nature—and being.16 
To give an example, a key ontological 
claim in the nature lectures and The Visible 
and the Invisible is that being is not 
governed by purely invisible essences 
ontologically divided from being. Rather 
this ‘essence’ is an invisible endogenous to, 
of, the visible. In contrast to purely invisible 
essences, this invisible cannot be purified of 
its visibility. In this sense, being is internally 
hollow, negative, there is a sort of invisible 
surplus endogenous to it. The invisible 
appears in/as the non-appearing of this 
surplus in appearance—but, crucially, the 
invisible does appear in and of the visible 
(rather than being a transcendent or entirely 
inapparent essence). The invisible appears 
in/as the sense, manifest in the visible, that 
there is more to the visible than now appears 
visible. Merleau-Ponty finds that this 
complex onto-logic resonates in the 
embryogenesis of animals: the visible 
organization of the animal body inseparably 
implicates invisible morphogenetic 
processes that are not reducible to the 
embryo’s visible fabric here and now, yet 
are not realizable as anything other than an 
invisible of the visible, since these processes 
are not independent of visible material. 
Animals thus manifest an onto-logic of 
being: they manifest the way that an 
invisible of the visible operates in being.  
What we are going to see below is how 
animals manifest a related onto-logic that 
shows us that space itself is not a pure 
invisible over and above things. That is, 
space does not have the sort of determinacy 
of an abstract container or dimension: its 
determinacy is engendered from within a 
sweep of being that is opened by a 
transspatial hollow endogenous to being. 
The engendering of determinacy from 
within this transspatial hollow is key to the 
invisible of the visible as generating sense. 
To prepare to grasp this point we need to 
briefly reflect on how we typically think 
about things and space.  
 
From What to When to Where: 
Transportable Thinking vs. Placed 
Thinking  
 
Western philosophy and science have long 
investigated humans, other animals, even 
being itself, by asking questions of the form: 
what is X? As Bergson and Heidegger17 
would variously suggest, such questions are 
molded to the kind of ‘what’ we are so 
geared to handle in everyday life: we 
suppose our question is answered by some 
already given thing or being, modeled on a 
given solid or tool that would already solve 
a problem. Unsurprisingly, this approach 
leads to an ontology of presence that 
ultimately answers “what is X?” type of 
questions by appeal to already given 
essences or substances. 
Problems in this approach have gradually 
led philosophy and science to attend to the 
‘when’ of things. Heidegger’s Being and 
Time gives a famous example: the being of 
Dasein is not a given ‘what,’ but an 
inherently temporal phenomenon. Dasein is 
when there is being-towards-death: Dasein’s 
being is the being of a kind of temporality—
a clue that the being of being is temporality, 
not an already present and determined 
substance. And as R. G. Collingwood 
insightfully remarks, nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century philosophy and science 
are in general characterized by a “principle 
of minimum time”: natural things are not 
‘whats,’ but realizations of functions, and 
there is a minimum time it takes for such 
realizations to appear.18 Biology and evo-
lution provide classic examples: if species 
and individual organisms are not eternal 
essences or their instantiations, but ongoing 
results of evolution and development, then 
observing them on a time-scale shorter than 
that of speciation or life-cycles misses the 
phenomenon. But other examples proliferate 
in current science. Scientists argue, for 
example, that the growth and strength of 
tendon is a function of stressing it19 or that 
cognition is not a function of fixed neural 
structures but of the brain as a plastic system 
that is a function of our dynamic interaction 
with the world.20
 
What appear to be things 
are in fact functions of time or, rather, of the 
temporality of things. For what determines 
appearances are certain rhythms and 
dynamics that ought be measured in terms of 
rates and dynamics characteristic of systems 
in which we find these things, not in terms 
of a clock-time specified in abstraction from 
things— much like music is best counted by 
its own beat. If you do not observe things in 
their own temporality, you will miss what is 
important to them. 
Attention to temporal dynamics, in turn, 
leads philosophy and science to the ‘where’ 
of things. Collingwood, for example, links 
the principle of minimum time to a 
“principle of minimum space.” The idea 
behind this principle is subtle yet deep. If 
water is a homogenous instantiation of an 
abstract essence, then it can appear as such 
in any arbitrarily small amount of water, 
since what ontologically determines water as 
water is an abstract essence that is 
determinate independent of space—
something metaspatial (beyond space), as 
Merleau-Ponty would put it.21 But if water 
is the realization of a function, then water 
only happens when certain differentiated 
fluxes are coordinated over time. As a 
function of coordination, water is a 
structure, a relation spread across some 
minimum number of atoms (H and O atoms 
that are themselves structures). If you 
observe nature on too small a scale, you will 
not find water taking place.  
But Collingwood’s line of thinking 
(through Whitehead, who also inspires 
Merleau-Ponty) also leads to the point that if 
you could observe nature on too small a 
scale you will not find space taking place 
either: space is a function of structure too; it 
is not a substance, not even a peculiarly 
empty one; it does not stand on its own as 
container. This broaches a deep and difficult 
point that will not be fully resolved here, but 
needs to be sketched to contextualize the 
discussions of animal development and 
navigation that follow—which in turn will 
shed light on this initial sketch.  
The point is that Collingwood’s line of 
thinking leads to a concept of space not as a 
container independent of and given in 
advance of what it contains, but as a 
function or expression of a more elemental 
‘whereness’ manifest in the spread of being, 
via the spreads of the various things there 
are. Space is a function of how things 
spread. Space is, as it were, formed as to its 
determinacy22 (as to the way it positions 
things) by what there is. So, instead of con-
ceptualizing space as a system with an 
already determinate power of positioning 
things in locations, we find that the 
determinate positions afforded by space are 
a regional function of what there is. The 
contrast here echoes one between 
Newtonian absolute space, and Leibnizian or 
Einsteinian space as an inherently relational 
system. But I will couch it in terms of a 
distinction between place and space 
developed by Edward S. Casey,23 and by 
Jeff Malpas24 in his studies of Heidegger’s 
place-based thinking. 
In this distinction, space is a system for 
determining locations that can be set up in 
advance of things, which thereby already 
locates movable things therein. In contrast, 
place is manifest in a concrete dynamic of 
movements and linkages that spread across 
things. What determines a place as the place 
that it is, and how a place reciprocally places 
things therein, involves an irreducible 
reciprocity between place and the primitive 
spread of things. This is cognate to the 
irreducible reciprocity between temporality 
and the primitive rates and rhythms of 
things. Temporality finds its measure in the 
change-dynamic of things; it is engendered 
in this change-dynamic, as an intensive flow 
proper to measuring such flow. Place finds 
its measure in the ‘spread-dynamic’25 of 
things and is engendered in this spread-
dynamic as proper to measuring such 
spread. In both cases we find a regionally 
engendered temporality and place that is 
dependent on a prior, more expansive 
temporality and place. We find that this 
place, this temporality devolves from a more 
capacious and already ongoing place and 
temporality. But here a key point comes into 
play: this already ongoing place and 
temporality is not an abstract absolute or 
universal, flowing from itself. Place and 
temporality are not yet or fully determinate. 
Place and temporality are in the mode of 
being: already-ongoing, not-yet determined; 
this is in contrast to being: already-given, 
already determinate. Temporality and place 
are in this sense hollow.  
A case for the hollowness of place is 
developed below by study of animal 
phenomena. But that study requires 
reorienting our thinking. For the point I have 
been developing is not only meant to 
challenge our usual tendency to pursue 
things—and space itself—by asking what 
things and space are, and answering in terms 
of substances or essences. It is meant to 
challenge a deeper prejudice of thinking 
that, on my view, underlies such essence- or 
substance-thinking, namely, what I call 
ontological localism. Ontological localism 
presumes that the determinacy and 
ontological substrate of a thing can be 
localized in the space the thing occupies, in 
a recursively nested way that ultimately 
positions determinacy in arbitrarily small 
points, such that things, space, and being 
itself can appear as determinate in any 
arbitrarily small point. 
Here I introduce a contrast between 
location and region to complement the 
above contrast between space and place. To 
explain this, I deploy position as a genus, to 
designate the determinacy of something with 
respect to either space or place. A location is 
the species of position proper to space. In 
virtue of a space already given in advance, a 
location can be positioned as, or in, an arbi-
trarily small point (in the way that water, in 
virtue of an essence, can be instantiated in 
an arbitrarily small amount). A region is the 
species of position proper to place; it lacks 
the discreteness or already given unity 
definitive of a location, it always reaches out 
beyond any localizable point. In contrast to 
localizable determinacy, the determinacy of 
a region—what positions a region as the 
region that it is—is a function of a broader 
region: the determinacy of a region is 
regional. A region, we could say, is not well 
bounded but rather has a horizonal character 
of bordering and thence opening up into 
broader and broader regions.26
 
 
Ontological localism is minimalist: it 
seeks to reduce spatial determinacy to 
atomic points, and thus operates with or is 
driven by a concept of space as already 
affording such atomic locatedness; space is 
the reticule of such locations, and enables 
what I call locative positioning of things. 
Conversely, ontological regionalism is 
maximally expansive, since regions are 
functions of the maximal region in which 
they operate. Whereas locations are 
locatively in the space that contains them, 
regions are of places: regions spring from, 
are engendered by, as well as express, place. 
Regional positioning is thus always 
approximate, partial, relative to various 
horizonal scales and involves movement or 
rest in a region. In contrast, locative 
positioning is definitive, discrete, and 
independent of scale. For example, I report 
my position differently when telling a friend 
where to meet me in a region of our 
neighborhood versus telling a Torontonian 
how to drive to my neighborhood region in 
Montréal. Places themselves articulate the 
different regions (e.g., café zones, city areas 
with distinct styles), scales, kinds of 
movement, and horizons that enable such 
regional positioning. In contrast, my GPS 
coordinates are the same at any scale.  
Ontological localism is correlative to a 
style of thinking that I call transportable 
thinking, which has a twofold aspect. First, it 
is a style of thinking that, ontologically, 
conceptualizes things as transportable 
‘whats,’ things that remain what they are 
when moved from location to location in 
space. It also conceptualizes space itself as 
peculiarly transportable: space is at once an 
absolute container over and above the 
transportable contents it locates, yet it is a 
frame of reference whose origin may be 
freely moved about (since space is isotropic, 
the same everywhere).27 Second, 
transportable thinking conceptualizes 
thinking as itself transportable, remaining 
the same wherever thinking might happen or 
whatever thinking might think about. 
Transportable thinking, in other words, 
entails the pensée de survole (thinking from 
above) that Merleau-Ponty constantly 
criticizes. What is being noted here is that it 
is characteristic of pensée de survole that it 
conceives both itself and its objects as only 
accidently modified or determined by 
position—and that it does so by identifying 
itself as thinking that is not positioned 
anywhere in particular but ranges over all of 
abstract space.  
Placed thinking is quite different from 
transportable thinking. Again, this has a 
twofold aspect. First, placed thinking 
conceptualizes what things are, the 
determinacy of things, as a function of the 
region in which they are placed. Second, 
placed thinking conceptualizes thinking 
itself as a function of the region in which it 
is placed. We might think of Darwin as an 
exemplar of placed thinking. It is often 
noted that his insights depend on conceiving 
life as evolving over an extraordinarily long 
minimum of time, that is, conceptualizing 
history as integral with the determinacy of 
organisms. But, it is hard to read Darwin’s 
Origin of Species, The Voyage of the Beagle, 
his other writings, and the copious literature 
on Darwin, without realizing that place is 
perhaps even more deeply ingredient in his 
thinking than time. Darwin could not 
possibly have posed his question about the 
diversity of species in the way that he did—
and his posing of the question is key to his 
remarkable answer— without first of all 
peregrinating from place to place (in person 
or through proxies) and grasping, on a 
perceptual and empirical level, that plants 





Placing Parts in Hydra Bodies  
 
So far I have sketched a divergence between 
two different ways of thinking, and their 
underlying ontologies: between 
transportable thinking that focuses on the 
‘what’ of things and placed thinking that 
focuses on the ‘where’ of things, where this 
‘where’ is understood in terms of regions of 
place, not locations in abstract space. But 
instead of making this point as above—
which does not escape a pensée de survole 
insofar as it works within the history of 
ideas—I now pursue this shift from 
transportable to placed thinking by way of a 
radical reflection on—and from within—
animal being.  
In this pursuit I am both following and 
extending a thought in MerleauPonty’s 
nature lectures. As Merleau-Ponty puts it in 
a discussion of recent advances in physics 
(which echoes points from Collingwood, 
although as far as I know Merleau-Ponty did 
not know Collingwood), “Space is not 
something”; it is not a thing or ‘what’ 
independent of spatial things. We have to 
put in question “the idea of a nature in itself 
of space,” independent of relations between 
things, and resist our “tendency to convert 
relations into things,” to convert space into a 
substantive and purely invisible thing that 
would already support spatial relations in 
advance (LN 141–42/103–4). This reflects 
an ontological point central to the third 
lecture, namely, that we must go beyond 
“corpuscular being as an absolutely hard 
nucleus, in favor of statistical and collective 
being” without, however, reducing that 
collective to a sum of corpuscular parts (LN 
275/213).  
In my terms, Merleau-Ponty is saying that 
we must move beyond ontological localism 
to regionalism. But this move is hard to 
follow, since it does not fit our usual ways of 
thinking. In the nature lectures, Merleau-
Ponty eventually finds a clue to it in the 
“organism [which] is not only its local-
instantaneous reality,” “nor moreover [is it] 
another reality” (something “metaspatial”), 
rather it is a ‘macroscopic “envelope-
phenomenon’” that is not reducible to given 
elements but is “rather between the 




To make sense of Merleau-Ponty’s point 
here, I first refer to his discussion of the 
embryology of Hans Driesch. Driesch 
discovered that (within limits), remarkably, 
animal embryos develop in typical ways 
even if they are, say, divided in two, or if 
patches of their surface are displaced from 
one position to another. In technical terms, 
embryos can robustly “regulate” growth in 
face of perturbations. In an analysis that 
amounts to a spatial echo of his typical 
dialectic with empiricism and rationalism, 
Merleau-Ponty argues that regulation cannot 
be rooted in either material atoms (the sort 
of “local-instantaneous reality” just 
mentioned above) or in something ideal 
(“another reality,” “something metaspatial”). 
Basically, if the body plan is localized in 
atomic parts, then moving parts around 
would disrupt the plan—which is not what 
happens. Drietsch therefore appeals to an 
“entelechy” ontologically beyond the parts. 
But this leaves the problem of accounting 
for the reality of such an entelechy and 
giving an account of how it could, as beyond 
the parts, determinately respond to, or 
coordinate with, the embryo-body so that 
growth can be regulated in face of 
perturbation. (Note that ontological localism 
is the tacit premise of these rejected 
alternatives.30 Note also that the problem 
here is cognate to that of classic Cartesian 
dualism: if mind must be ontologically 
beyond the body to do the job that it does, 
then we cannot account for the internal 
coordination between mind and body—
which is in fact crucial to the job of mind.) 
Merleau-Ponty thus pursues a determinacy 
that arises within the embryo itself (not in 
something metaspatial) without yet being 
purely local to atomic points: a determinacy 
that is “rather between the elements,” 
something that is “transspatial,” an 
“envelope-phenomenon” (LN 275/213).  
To make sense of this transspatiality, I 
develop below a new concept, intensive 
sweep, or sweep for short, to capture a 
determinacy that arises in the ways that 
regions sweep into one another via their 
‘spread-dynamic.’ I develop this concept, 
and thence Merleau-Ponty’s concept of 
transspatiality, by discussing a recent claim 
by Rohlf and Bornholdt31 about the hydra—
a claim that makes Merleau-Ponty look 
prescient in seeking the embryo’s 
determinacy in a transspatial relation.  
The hydra, a microscopic animal, has 
what is called a bud zone, from which it 
buds offspring. This zone is (nearly) always 
two thirds of the way down the hydra’s 
body. How is the bud zone positioned 
precisely at this point? We cannot say it is 
because of a special bud cell found two 
thirds of the way down, for this begs the 
question of why it is found there and not 
elsewhere. Moreover, we would need to say 
how this cell tracks the growth of the hydra, 
for its position is regulatory: the bud zone’s 
position remains near invariant, two thirds 
down the body, through changes of hydra 
size over a tenfold range. Can we say that 
the hydra’s genes are an idealized blueprint 
that, as it were, looks down on the hydra 
body and specifies that the bud zone is to be 
two thirds down the hydra, whatever its 
size? But this begs the question, broached 
above, of how the blueprint and body are 
coordinated. In any case this image of a 
blueprint whose determinacy is separable 
from the body, biologically speaking, is 
mythical. The hydra’s genetic material is 
crucial to determining the bud zone, but not 
as an abstract blueprint. In concrete 
biological terms, we find complex genetic 
dynamics32 inside each cell of the growing 
body, in which: multiple segments of the 
genetic material are transcribed so as to 
produce proteins, or to dynamically regulate 
the transcription of other genetic segments; 
and in which this dynamic is modulated by 
other materials and dynamics of the cell, 
including genetic signals travelling between 
cells.33 This dynamic distributes genetic 
signals along the hydra such that there is a 
“rather graded decay” of “CN-NK2 
expression” in the “budding region,” while 
“Hedgehog (Hh) is turned off precisely just 
below the budding region” (Rohlf and 
Bornholdt, 178).  
This distribution of genetic signals within 
the body determines part placement. The 
question is: what determines this 
distribution? Is it something local to each 
point, or a pattern that could be determined 
in abstraction from the points? The answer 
likely is something in between. Rohlf and 
Bornoldt show that in principle a process kin 
to the operation of a cellular automaton 
could produce the distribution. They 
simulate a line of cells that are linked by a 
complex network of interactions, in which:  
(1) within a given cell i, genes G1 and G2 
interact in such a way that  
(2) this interaction is modulated by 
receptors in the cell membrane of i that 
are responsive to the results of G1/G2 
interactions in the immediately 
neighboring cells i-1 and i+1, and  
(3) this interaction in turn modulates 
receptors that modulate G1/G2 
interactions in those neighboring cells i-1 
and i+1.  
In their simulation, gene expression is 
robustly regulated such that a sharp division 
in the expression pattern always occurs two 
thirds of the way down the line of cells.  
While Rohlf and Bornholdt’s result is 
merely theoretical (their work is in 
theoretical biology), the principles at work 
in it correspond to real principles of 
embryogenesis, for example: heterotopy, the 
principle that divergences in morphology of 
different organisms often have to do with 
changes in the spatiotemporal regulation of 
the expression of a basic toolkit of genes 
shared by different organisms, versus 
differences in the basic toolkit; that is, 
divergence is by way of rendering places 
different in the organism, rather than 
producing different materials; and mosaic 
pleiotropy, the principle that very often a 
given protein expressed in the growing 
embryo works in many different ways in 
different places in the organism.34 Internal 
division of the embryo into different regions 
is crucial to embryogenesis.  
This leads to a conceptual point having to 
do with placed vs. transportable thinking. 
Returning to Rolhf and Bornholdt’s model, 
notice how in themselves the cells that 
determine bud placement do not contain 
(strictly speaking) anything like a measure 
of where they are with respect to some 
overall plan of the hydra. For us, observing, 
we can say: this determinate concentration 
of gene products marks a point two thirds 
down the body. But concretely: the 
concentration of genetic signals has its 
determinacy and determinate function (of 
positioning the bud) in virtue of the adjacent 
cells that form its immediate region, as 
swept up in ever more encompassing 
regions—ultimately the region of the hydra 
body as a whole in exchange with its 
environment.35 It is in virtue of this sweep 
of interactions across regions that there is
genetic signal concentration that positions 
the bud zone. But the latter is thus 
inseparably internal to this sweep: the 
concentration is not determinate in terms of 
 a 
abstract measures from above (e.g., “2/3 of 
the way down”). Its function as determining 
the place of the hydra bud zone is insep-
arable from where it is, from the dynamic 
latitude opened by the spread of this 
‘where,’ as the specific ‘where’ of a hydra-
body-in-its-environment. It is thus a function 
of its narrow region as verging into broader 
regions. This is all the more the case when 
we shift from the simplified simulation to 
the living hydra. This animal phenomenon 
demands placed, not transportable, thinking.  
Here I have introduced sweep as a 
technical term, proper to placed thinking, to 
designate interactions and relations that run 
through adjacent and nested regions and that 
thereby engender determinate differences 
across said regions. The determinacy 
engendered by such sweep is intensive, in 
Bergson’s sense: the determinacies that 
contribute to the determinacy of an overall 
sweep cannot be separated from one another 
or put alongside one another; they are 
internal to one another and modify one 
another’s determinacy in the way that one’s 
childhood (for Bergson) is internal to and 
shapes the sense of one’s life as an enduring, 
unfolding whole. This is in contrast to a 
classic example of an extensive determinacy 
or measure, namely a meter: dividing a 
meter stick in two gives you two half-meter-
long segments that can be put alongside one 
another, and the division does not change 
the meter standard. In contrast, if divided 
halves of a hydra remained viable, each such 
hydra would engender its own endogenous 
standard, with the bud zone growing (as we 
put it, from the outside) two thirds down 
each. Contrast this with cutting the meter 
stick in half. When you do this, the rulings 
and markings on the stick do not change. So, 
on one piece, the point we call two thirds 
down would appear at the 33.3 cm mark 
(two thirds down between 0 and 50 cm); on 
the other, this point would appear at the 83.3 
cm mark (two thirds down between 50 and 
100 cm). If the meter stick were like the 
hydra, then cutting it in two would, in 
contrast, yield a qualitative change two 
thirds of the way down each piece, via an 
overall change along the whole piece: all the 
‘markings’ and ‘rules’ would change their 
intensity when you cut it in two.  
To give a better sense of what I mean by 
sweep, let me speak of music. It is the sweep 
of the music, its internal rhythmic and 
harmonic modulations, that determine when 
a piece turns from (say) developing tensions 
to resolving them. The resolution’s advent is 
properly measured not by a clock that 
always divvies up time the same way, 
independent of when things happen, but in 
terms endogenous to the flow of the music 
itself, which involves the intensity of the 
music’s own temporality. If we distinguish 
lived temporality from scientific time, the 
classic Newtonian clock provides a 
peculiarly atemporal measure of time: the 
clock parcels out eternity in the same way, 
whenever you are, independent of your 
flowing temporality. But music resists such 
atemporal thinking, because its meter is 
precisely inseparable from the internal, 
intensive sweep of its temporality. Similarly, 
the point here is that the hydra, in the very 
regulation of its growth, resists what I have 
called transportable thinking: the way it 
places parts is precisely inseparable from the 
internal, intensive sweep of its regions.  
The link between the temporal sweep of 
music and the regional sweep of the 
organism is likely no mere accident. Goethe 
calls architecture frozen music, and what we 
are seeing here is that the organism’s 
‘architecture’ is kin to frozen (genetic) 
music—something Goethe grasped at least 
implicitly in conceptualizing flowers as 
spatially depositing, along a growing stem, 
successive variations of the cotyledon.36 
This link between temporal and regional 
sweep is something I am trying to capture by 
playing on “sweep” as at once a noun and a 
verb.  
Animal body plans are not laid out and 
determined in an abstract space (even if we 
see them that way); rather they forge 
themselves from within the body region, by 
way of sweep, a transspatial modulation 
ranging across (and beyond) this region. The 
growth of the animal to type, then, is a 
matter not of positioning transportable 
parts, each in its right position, in an 
abstract space, but of growing an animal 
body as a region whose sweep differentiates, 
for the first time, nontransportable regions 
for growing (for example) a leg versus an 
antenna—in the way that a geographical 
region sweeps out nontransportable 
subregions for growing grapes versus 
fishing. And this differential sweep is not 
due to a map of locative positions applied to 
the region from above, but due to a power of 
differences that develop by way of tensions 
that endogenously sweep across regions and 
their content. This means that in animal 
being, place—and a kind of power that place 
harbors—matters over space as neutral 
container.  
What I am articulating here is something 
that Merleau-Ponty is noticing as central to 
being. For example, in the third nature 
lecture, his analysis of Driesch’s 
embryology leads him to reject the 
alternatives of either local-instantaneous or 
metaspatial realities as the source of the 
embryo’s developing determinacy and to 
conceptualize this determinacy as arising 
through “transspatial” relations, in virtue of 
which what I call regions already “envelop” 
one another. The phenomenon of life 
testifies against “a hard nucleus of being” 
(against localizable, corpuscular being) and 
for the “softness of the flesh.” We must, he 
writes, “[d]issociate our idea of Being from 
that of a thing: life is not a separable thing, 
but an investment, a singular point, a hollow 
in Being, an invariant ontological relief, a 
transverse rather than longitudinal causality 
telescoping the other” (LN 302/238). Life 
emerges internal to being, and not (merely) 
by a longitudinal generativity of time but by 
what I would call a transverse sweep of 
regions sweeping/telescoping over one 
another. This echoes an ontological point in 
the passivity lectures (articulated via 
Husserl, but in a long analysis departing 
from Ruyer’s biology) that the thing “is 
absolute plenitude only in the face of 
isolating analysis” and even so “it is a hol-
low plenitude: presence but absence” (IP 
174). In turn, these resonate with a point in a 
complex analysis of Bergson’s critique of 
the negative and nothingness, in which 
Merleau-Ponty criticizes Bergson for in fact 
having a positivism in which “the absence of 
a thing” is “only the presence of something 
else” and argues that we must conceive “one 
sole Being that has an absolute negativity in 
its flesh” (LN 96/65). This takes us back to a 
point following our first quote from LN 
immediately above, that “life is not 
negativity,” by which he means, that life—
and the being of life—is not a positively 
given, already fixed, transportable negative, 
rather it is “field, dimension . . . depth for 
flat beings” (LN 302/238).37 I take it that 
Merleau-Ponty is saying there is an internal 
depth or latitude, a “softness” of being, in 
virtue of transverse, trans-spatial (vs. merely 
longitudinal, transtemporal) relations opened 
by being. This soft hollow allows for the 
engendering of determinacy, not by a given 
negativity, but by a not, a negative, that is 
not-yet—where this not yet is transspatially 
sweeping in character, in contrast to the not-
yet of Derrida’s différance.  
But this ontological point, about a spatial-
type hollow of being, is hard to grasp. And 
this, I think, is because we are, by virtue of 
the particularities of our kind of animal 
being, better geared to transportable thinking 
than placed thinking. As well, the sort of 
cognitive ability that Descartes detects better 
tunes us to temporal not-yetness than 
transspatial not-yetness. So I now want to 
give further insight into the ontological point 
about sweep by exploring this difference 
between us and other animals. I show how 
we tend to navigate by way of idealized 
spatial blueprints, while other animals tend 
to navigate from within the intensive sweep 
of regions—so that we have mostly lost our 
sense of the sweeping power of place.  
 
Following Loggerhead Sea-Turtles into 
Place  
 
All animals depend on the places they 
inhabit to provide food and suitable 
conditions for producing and raising 
offspring. But a habitat suitable for rearing 
offspring is not necessarily suitable for 
feeding, or this suitability may vary with the 
seasons. Hence animals often need to exploit 
“widely separated habitats at different times 
of their lives,”38 that is, migrate. Instead of 
migrating, for the most part we human 
animals instead learn how to forge dwell-
ings, technologies, and economies that 
render us relatively insensitive to climate 
and location. We bring what we need to us, 
instituting a style of living that is likely 
coeval with transportable thinking: where 
you are does not matter very much when 
you can live most anywhere.  
In contrast, consider loggerhead sea turtles 
(Caretta caretta), which hatch in one sort of 
habitat but need to move to other habitats to 
find food for growth, which habitats are not 
suitable for nesting and hatching. How do 
adults find a habitat suitable for hatching the 
next generation? Loggerheads have evolved 
a simple solution: returning to their exact 
place of birth, across thousands of 
kilometres of sea (which other sea, land, and 
air species do as well). A contrast between 
the placed and the transportable is already at 
work here: a loggerhead does not search for 
a sort of habitat suitable for hatching, 
wherever that might be; it searches for just 
this one place, which is not transportable.  
How does the loggerhead accomplish such 
a navigational feat? I focus on loggerheads, 
despite the fact that navigation in land- and 
air- (vs. sea-) nonhuman animals is better 
understood, because it enables a comparison 
with some remarkable studies of human sea 
navigation—and because the sea’s unique 
“sensory ecology” presents special 
navigational problems that bring crucial 
points to light.39 Basically, the latter 
problems are due to water’s density. While 
water carries scents better than does air, and 
wind-driven waves propagating in 
seasonally constant directions can provide 
navigational cues, water absorbs and scatters 
light in such a way that “[v]isual landmarks 
are absent” and “celestial cues” are rarely 
perceptible; moreover, animals in water are 
“continuously susceptible to . . . currents” 
yet lack the sort of visual references against 
which wind-blown birds can correct drift.40
 
 
Scientists argue that sea animals 
navigating this problem need two sense 
faculties. First, a “map sense” that “enables 
the animal to determine its position relative 
to the goal (or at least the direction in which 
it should travel [from where it is])”—a sense 
that positions the target and animal relative 
to one another. Second, a “compass sense,” 
“used to maintain a heading in the 




Lohmann and his colleagues hypothesize 
that the loggerhead’s map sense has a 
magnetic basis. Imagine the earth’s 
magnetic field lines as narrow ribbons. At 
the magnetic equator, these run in a shallow 
‘S’ curve relative to the geographical 
equator, and the surface of the ‘ribbon’ is 
parallel to the earth’s surface. As one moves 
north, the surface of these ribbons inclines 
more toward the earth’s surface, and 
conversely for moving south. Field lines 
also vary in intensity, independent of 
inclination. A line traced through places 
with the same magnetic inclination is an 
isoclinic, one traced through places with the 
same magnetic intensity is an isodynamic. 
Isoclinics and isodynamics (collectively 
called isolines) do not exactly line up, but 
describe a drapery of overlapping scalloped 
curves, such that a combination of a given 
isoclinic and isodynamic can roughly 
identify a particular region. The hypothesis 
is that sea turtles imprint on the isoclinic and 
isodynamic of their birthplace. To return to 
it, they either first navigate ‘by compass’ 
such that they hit a coastline, and then move 
up or down the coast until they sense the 
isolines on which they were imprinted; 
alternately, they might navigate at sea to find 
their isoline, and then follow it into the 
coast. After this first phase of navigation, 
once near their birth region, the turtles enter 
a second phase of navigation in which other 
cues (isolines are too rough) could guide the 
turtle to its birth-beach. Lab and field 
experiments support the first part of this 
“biphasic” hypothesis by showing that 
loggerheads do in fact orient to magnetic 
fields. For example, captured older turtles, 
exposed to (experimentally produced) 
magnetic fields that would exist 340 km N 
or S of their capture site, “swam in 
directions that would have led them home 
had they actually been displaced to the 
locations where the two fields exist.”42 
Drawing on our discussion above, we can 
say that the loggerhead is sensitive to the 
intensive sweep of regions, as manifest in 
magnetic variations sedimented in the earth 
by its intensive geological formation43 (in 
something of an analogy to the sweep of 
genetic signals sedimented in the growth of 
the hydra body). Biologists conceptualize 
bees and flowers as co-evolving: the color of 
flowers is ‘selected’ to attract bee-
pollinators, and bee vision is ‘selected’ to be 
sensitive to flower-colors that sweep out 
food regions. The point here is that 
loggerheads have evolved sensitivity to an 
existing magnetic sweep of the earth. But 
this means that the loggerhead and its life-
cycle is a function of the magnetic sweep of 
the regions it inhabits. While the loggerhead 
of course moves around from region to 
region, it is not properly speaking a 
‘transportable animal’: it cannot get around 
in loggerheadly-living ways in any old 
place, just this one. Indeed, the above 
hypothesis depends on the regional 
contingency that the coasts on which 
loggerheads hatch happen to run mostly N-
S, while isolines run E-W—which lets 
isolines differentiate coasts into different 
regions.  
The loggerhead is oriented by the sweep of 
its region, and so has a very different, 
interior, intensive relation to place than we 
humans typically do, as (relatively) 
transportable animals who can live most 
anywhere and tend to get around by 
extensively dividing up space as appropriate 
to different tasks. Here we once again run 
into a subtle and difficult conceptual point at 
stake in the difference between placed and 
transportable thinking. The point could 
perhaps be drawn out by way of Merleau-
Ponty’s remarks on the spatiality of animals 
such as the jellyfish, the chimpanzee, and 
the human. But I want, instead, to tackle the 
conceptual issue by availing myself of two 
recent results. (We are also approaching 
here points arising in discussions of 
Heidegger’s contrast between Dasein’s 
being-in, things as in containers, and 
animals as captivated by their environment, 
as well as issues in Deleuze—but in a differ-
ent and more fine-grained way.)44
 
 
The first is Colin Ellard’s synthesis of 
studies of the psychology of navigation, in 
Where Am I? Why We Can Find Our Way to 
the Moon But Get Lost in the Mall.45 
Throughout, Ellard flags a remarkable fact: 
we humans are easily lost, whereas it is 
quite the opposite with other animals. 
Indeed, Ellard writes that some experiments 
“require that animals lose all sense of spatial 
connection with the world outside the walls 
of the testing room” to ensure that “the 
behaviour of the animals is under the 
complete control of cues present in the 
room”; yet it can be so “extraordinarily 
difficult to produce that state of spatial 
detachment in an animal” that in Ellard’s 
laboratory, “animals are sometimes 
conveyed from one place to another inside a 
light-free container that is rotated on a 
turntable en route to the testing room”—
otherwise the animal will show signs of not 
being lost. In contrast, humans are so bad at 
navigating that Ellard’s problem is not 
getting them lost but, for example, providing 
them “with enough support that they can 
find their way [blindfolded] across an 
ordinary rectangular room without banging 
their heads into the walls” (73–75).  
What is the basis of this difference 
between human animals and other animals? 
Let me condense Ellard’s detailed survey 
into a twofold point. First, on a sensory-
motor level, humans have (or typically 
cultivate) very different capacities, abilities, 
and skills from those of most other animals: 
our sensing and moving ability is usually 
much coarser. Second, we navigate by way 
of abstract symbols or maps, as if looking 
down on ourselves from above, as if the task 
is transporting ourselves according to a 
space that maps onto our surroundings, 
rather than being tuned to the sweep of 
regions we inhabit as already determinately 
positioning us. There is a convergence here 
between Ellard’s psychological point and 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the pensée 
survole, which both inform my concept of 
transportable thinking. We could think of 
this second feature—navigation by abstract 
concepts—as a compensatory strategy for 
our weak sensory-motor ability, or 
conversely, we could think of our tendency 
to navigate by abstraction as enabling 
sensory-motor inattention. Either way, to put 
it in a nutshell, we are generally inobservant 
and inclined to abstraction, or, more 
precisely: we observe abstractions rather 
than sensuous detail. Suppose we present 
various animals with a cache in the centre of 
a square defined by four landmarks and then 
increase the square’s size. Rats or gerbils 
“will search [for the cache] in a series of 
four different locations,” each “the same 
distance and direction from the landmark as 
before the change,” whereas humans 
“continue to search in the centre of the 
square as defined by the four landmarks”—
we search by way of the abstraction “center” 
(43–44). We are easily lost in the forest 
because we see trees X, Y, and Z not as 
three singular, unique, individuals but as 
three instances of tree-in-general. Overall, 
Ellard notes that “psychological tendencies 
that have their roots in the orientation of our 
body and the organization of our senses 
seem to have taken precedence over what 
we see and feel of the dimensions of 
physical space,” such that we “construct 
spaces rather than sense them” (123).  
My claim is that it is because we construct 
extensive spaces, rather than sense the 
intensive sweep of regions, that we are 
inclined to transportable rather than placed 
thinking. To navigate, we humans cultivate 
mutually reinforcing ways of observing and 
conceptualizing our reality; and the ways 
typically cultivated by the Western tradition 
blind us to the power of place, by inclining 
us to conceptualize space as a fixed, neutral 
system, rather than to sense our 
surroundings as a region with its own 
intensive dynamic.  
This becomes apparent through our 
second result, a remarkably insightful and 
detailed study of human sea navigation 
practices in Edwin Hutchins’ Cognition in 
the Wild. Hutchins’s aim is to show that 
traditional Western navigation practice (his 
focus is American naval ships piloting into 
port) depends on the embodiment of 
cognitive/computational processes in the 
instruments, charts, and interaction of the 
navigators. But on the way he draws a 
conceptually insightful distinction between 
Western and Micronesian navigation 
practices (especially in Puluwat).  
Crucially, Hutchins does not 
conceptualize Western practice as superior 
to the Puluwatan or vice versa: they are 
different solutions to a single, underlying 
computational problem, namely, detecting 
environmental features that specify 
constraints on one’s position (e.g., “I am 
somewhere on this heading”) and combining 
constraints to uniquely fix one’s position. 
Basically, the Western solution is to do most 
of the computation in advance. Charts 
embody complex computations: drawing 
lines on them and/or measuring them lets 
you calculate either your distance or 
direction to your destination (depending on 
the chart’s projection type); the intersection 
of lines computes where you are. The 
Western navigator’s main task is observing 
features in the real world via devices (e.g., 
compasses, or sighting devices that display 
the angle between a landmark and the 
vessel) that output numbers that embody 
computations that allow coordination of the 
chart with real world position. This enables 
drawing lines on the chart that compute 
where you are.  
This navigation practice, I suggest, is 
complementary to or coeval with Cartesian 
dualism. First, the task is coordinating (via 
latitude and longitude coordinates) the 
bodily place you are in with a 
representational space that is different from 
place, in being clear and distinct, abstract, 
mathematized, ready-made. Second, 
provided with the charts, tools, and skills, 
the navigator can pull this off no matter 
where she is. Third, to navigate this way is 
thence to first locate oneself as a 
transportable, universal subject via a pensée 
survole that reduces one’s body to a 
coordinate that coordinates with a 
transportable, Cartesian space that is 
navigation’s real concern. For a culture to 
solve the problem of navigation this way, it 
must already (or eventually needs to) be 
prepared to think of bodies and space in a 
transportable and disembodied manner. (Yet 
even in this mode of navigation, abstract 
space still needs to be coordinated with 
bodily place—but on the extensive terms of 
a ready-made space that can be assigned 
coordinates in advance.)  
In contrast, Puluwatan navigation depends 
on what Hutchins calls a “situated seeing” 
attuned to what I have called the intensive 
sweep of regions. This entails a very 
different concept of place.46 Put in 
Hutchins’s framework, the Puluwatan learns 
to see the world itself as solving the 
computational problem. On the long range, 
Puluwatan navigators learn to see the 
circling stars as a compass, and they 
memorize the relative locations of islands 
according to this compass. To head from 
island A to B, for example, one sets out for 
B by heading in the direction indicated by a 
circle of stars that, over the night, suc-
cessively rise or set at the horizon in a way 
that invariantly marks determinate earthly 
directions. To navigate by star compass, 
Puluwatan navigators also need to adjust 
their initial heading to compensate for 
(seasonably variable) prevailing winds and 
currents—which again must be memorized. 
And they have to be incredibly sensitive to 
and knowledgeable of prevailing swells, 
wave action, wind, and so on, to keep the 
sailing canoe on heading. To home in on a 
destination island, once in its rough vicinity, 
navigators orient by a more fine-grained 
situated perception, tuned, for example, to 
changes in wave patterns due to interference 
from islands, changes in water color or smell 
due to underwater sea mounts or 
biogeographical features, changes in sky 
color above islands due to reflectance from 
islands, or changes in sea life, such as the 
presence of certain fish or birds that move in 
relation to islands in species-specific ways. 
Several things are of note here. First, such 
navigation is immersed in the intensive 
sweep of things: the task is to see how 
regions compute one’s position through their 
endogenous differences. Second, the sweep 
through which one navigates is not 
transportable or abstractable. A Western 
navigator at any arbitrary coordinate X 
(given the charts and apparatus) can, in 
principle, navigate to any other arbitrary 
coordinate Y. As locative positions, all such 
coordinates are interchangeable; and where 
you are does not matter to your ability to 
navigate to Y, since your locative position is 
a coordinate in an abstract space whose 
extensive measures are globally invariant. 
(But even in this practice, local knowledge 
can be important, especially in pilotage to 
port—although perhaps this is becoming 
less important with GPS systems.) In 
contrast, on routes between islands, the 
Puluwatan navigates by learning to perceive 
cues endogenous to specific regions. Indeed, 
the navigational efficacy of the star compass 
is contingent on the islands visited being 
distributed more on an E-W than N-S axis, 
and being in a narrow band near the equator. 
Moreover, knowing how to sail from island 
A to B, and from B to C, will not necessarily 
enable sailing directly from C back to A—or 
from A to C. This seems very strange if we 
conceptualize navigation as transporting 
oneself around in an abstract space, for 
travelling from A to C via B would entail 
knowing where A and C are—knowing their 
coordinates—and once one knows that, one 
can navigate from C to A.  
This precisely emphasizes that the 
Puluwatan does not navigate an abstract 
space. He knows where islands are not by 
abstract locative coordinates, such that the 
determinate position of A can, as it were, be 
transported with the Puluwatan from B to C, 
with A’s location remaining what it is 
independent of where the navigator is. 
Rather, the Puluwatan senses a regional 
positioning of islands from within the 
intensive sweep of island regions 
themselves.  
This is most emphatic when we attend to 
the Puluwatan way of conceptualizing 
progress to destination, which is called etak. 
To navigate from island A to B by star 
compass, you need to know your position 
relative to B, so you can start homing in 
when near it. It is not surprising that 
Puluwatan navigators sense this position via 
intensive sweep, not abstract, extensive 
measures from above. Imagine walking 
eastward from A to B along a long E-W 
street. An office tower, C, far to the north of 
the midpoint of AB, will appear to drift back 
along the horizon as you approach B: at A, 
the direction from you to C is NE; at the 
midpoint it is N; at B it is NW. Puluwatans 
similarly sense their position by 
conceptualizing a distant reference island 
(sometimes imaginary), invisible over the 
horizon, drifting back under different star 
bearings, in a line along the horizon. 
Here a subtle and difficult conceptual point 
comes into play. The point is difficult 
precisely because, Hutchins argues, we 
Westerners (including other scholars whose 
position he is contesting) automatically 
conceive etak as a way of measuring 
distance along an already described line A 
and B, via the triangle that A-B forms with 
C. That is, we conceptualize navigation by 
etak as if we are looking at it from above: 
we plot various positions P1, P2, on A-B, 
draw lines from each P n to C, and notice 
that the changing direction from Pn to C in a 
space already given corresponds to and thus 
measures given segments of A-B. But 
Hutchins persuasively argues that this 
misrepresents Puluwatan concepts and 
experience. First, in general, a Puluwatan 
conceptualizes and experiences his canoe as 
stationary, with water and islands moving 
toward and past it. Gladwin has a very 
compelling description of this experience, 
which resonates with Husserl’s47 discussion 
of the ship moving between the stars being 
stationary for the explorers, and Thor 
Heyerdahl’s report of this sort of experience 
in his long voyage on the raft Kon-Tiki. 
Second, Puluwatans also experience the 
reference island as moving. Third, Hutchins 
cites Lewis’ report of an exchange with a 
master navigator, Hipour. Lewis was trying 
to locate an island, Ngatik. Hipour knew the 
star bearings to sail to Ngatik from Oroluk 
and from Ponape. But when Lewis located 
Oroluk and Ponape on a map, and then used 
the star bearings from these two islands to 
triangulate to where Ngatik must be, Hipour 
failed to grasp the idea behind this. Hipour 
could only grasp the idea by imagining 
himself to be simultaneously (1) sailing from 
Oroluk to Ponape and (2) sailing the reverse 
voyage—and picturing the etak bearings to 
Ngatik from within the beginnings of both 
voyages. Hutchins argues this is because 
Hipour is not navigating, as Westerners do, 
via “a global representation of the locations 
of various pieces of land relative to each 
other” as seen from a “bird’s-eye” view. For 
Hipour, the star bearing of an island “is not 
simply the orientation of a line in space but 
the direction of a star point from the 
position of a navigator”—it is not a 
transportable bearing. You have to be in the 
region where the bearing is taken for it to 
make sense, and bearings do not make sense 
as lines in an abstractly given space (which 
would enable Lewis’ triangulation 
procedure) but as ways of modulating the 
moving sweep of regions.  
Again, it must be emphasized that in 
voyaging through regions, the Puluwatan 
experiences stars and islands as moving 
around, relative to one another, in a 
characteristic pattern—rather than 
experiencing himself as moving through a 
fixed layout. It is this moving pattern that 
sweeps out a determinate texture of a 
region—and that enables positioning of 
islands in it. As with the hydra body, we do 
not first have an abstract, blank space, and 
then the locating of points in it: what we first 
of all have is a movement that sweeps out 
differences.  
Altogether, as I understand Hutchins, his 
point is this: The Western navigator 
positions herself by way of bringing together 
two different constraints (e.g.: bearing and 
distance to target; or two bearings to two 
targets, which triangulate one’s position) 
that locate her in a space grasped from 
above— what I called locative positioning. 
The Puluwatan positions himself by way of 
two constraints, but they are rather different: 
they are not constraints in an abstract space, 
but sensuously endogenous to a region. One 
constraint is the heading toward the target 
island. This is experienced in keeping the 
canoe on the track of a circle of stars in the 
star compass. The second is etak. This is 
experienced as the movement of the 
reference island along the horizon, which 
horizon is experienced as running parallel to 
one’s heading. Think back to my example of 
walking from A to B: to navigate this 
course, you stick to the street straight ahead, 
and see the destination nearing in the 
movement of the tower C sliding back in a 
line alongside you. Or think of the like 
phenomenon in various different train 
journeys, where you see a distant mountain 
sliding back in a rate/rhythm that 
characterizes the arc of the journey. The 
relative rhythms/rates of your straight course 
and the sliding of the reference point gives 
you a sense of your regional progress and 
position—but does so in terms of intensive 
sweeps endogenous to your movement 
through the region (if you do not convert 
this into a view from above). That is, we 
might think that the Puluwatan’s experience 
of journeying from A to B and nearing the 
end of the trip is cognate, in experiential 
structure, to sensing an unfolding piece of 
music come to its close. The difference is 
that the resolution criteria of the journey 
need to be learned and memorized (rather 
than instituted by musical practice), since 
they are endogenous to the various different 
regions travelled through and the way 
islands work together. So we could say that 
the Puluwatan memorizes and learns to see a 
kind of music, or better, dance, of regions 
that engenders a determinacy of subregions. 
This dance of regions is what I am getting at 
by intensive sweep—and what we 
Westerners, Cartesian geometers—and 
Cartesians—typically fail to notice.  
This is also, on first glance, the sort of 
thing to which loggerheads evolve 
physiological sensitivity. But it would be a 
tremendous mistake to think that Puluwatan 
navigation practice, insofar as it is cognate 
to the loggerhead biphasic strategy and is 
attuned to the intensive sweep of regions, is 
‘more animal’ than the Western practice. 
That would entirely neglect the fact that 
Puluwatan navigation is a cultural product 
that entails developing knowledge and 
conceptual systems and drawing on general 
capacities of human bodies to cultivate 
highly sensitive observational abilities. The 
Puluwatan and Western navigation practices 
are two different ways of compensating for 
the fact that human animals are easily lost 
and do not have inborn sensitivity to the 
sweep of regions. If the Puluwatan and 
loggerhead strategies are cognate, it is 
because both are navigating a similar 
problem. The navigational practice of the 
Puluwatans constructs a way into the sort of 
intensive sweep of regions to which 
loggerheads have evolved sensitivity, while 
Westerners construct an extensive space in 
which to navigate—although, as Hutchins 
notes, before the invention of the compass 
Western navigation looked much more like 
the star and place oriented practice of 
Puluwatans. Nonetheless, because Puluwa-
tan culture tunes navigators to intensive 
sweep, it gives us an insight into an 
ontology in which space is not corpuscular 
and concrete, but intensive, dynamic, 
enveloping, transspatial—and hollow. For 
what the Puluwatan experiences are regions 
as determined by the relative dancing 
slippage and movement of islands, stars, and 
bodies relative to and in virtue of one anoth-
er’s mutual envelopment. This sort of 
slippage is implicitly leveraged in the 
hydra’s growth as differentiating regions 




We thus circle back to the conceptual 
juncture between animal being, the being of 
place, the being of diversity, and the 
difference between the human animal and 
other animals.  
First, via study of loggerhead and human 
animal navigation, we see that determinate 
movement on this planet entails 
encountering the being of place as having its 
own intensive dynamic, its own way of 
sweeping out regions. We do not usually 
notice this because we tend to a 
transportable thinking that immediately 
reduces the intensity of regional sweep to 
the extensity of an abstract space of 
locations mapped from above. But in the 
examples of the loggerhead and hydra, we 
find cases in which positioning the animal 
self or its parts involves a moving 
modulation through the intensive sweep of 
regions, something spatially cognate to a 
musician finding her way to the end of the 
piece, not by knowing from the beginning at 
what time or on what note it is going to end, 
but by feeling a resolution grow and coil 
from within the music’s flow. That the 
determinacy of regions involves this 
‘music,’ or better, ‘dance’ of sweep becomes 
express in the Puluwatan experience of 
navigation, on my understanding of it.  
Second, this sort of determinacy entails an 
opening, a latitude for movement, in the 
interrelation of regions that allows an 
intensive power to sweep across regions and 
differentiate them. This is what we noticed 
as crucial to placing parts in the hydra body. 
Here we should notice that, on a geological 
time scale, islands do in fact drift relative to 
one another. Conceptualizing them as fixed 
in space entails a certain temporal 
perspective. The astronaut navigating 
between circling planets cannot easily 
conceptualize planets as fixed this way. It is 
also the case that experiencing islands as 
fixed requires a spatial perspective, namely, 
a view from above. This view is crucial to 
the Western navigation strategy. But this 
view from above still needs to be coor-
dinated with experienced place as 
intensively modulating itself: that’s where 
the work of Western navigation happens. So, 
the Western navigation practice does not rid 
place of its intensity but, rather, fails to see 
it as and for what it is. But noticing this 
educates us into a conceptual blind spot: we 
cannot see that the being of place has a 
power to it, a non-givenness or dynamic, 
that is as powerful, non-given, or dynamic 
as the power we find—and that phenom-
enology detects—in temporality as not-yet-
given.  
I maintain that it is this spatial-type not-
yet-givenness, and its power to generate 
sense, that Merleau-Ponty is broaching when 
he speaks of a hollow or negative in being 
that is crucial to the sense we find, for 
example, in the growth of animal bodies. To 
put it another way, above I distinguished 
ontological localism, which seeks to 
conceptualize the determinacy of things as 
localizable in arbitrarily small points, and 
ontological regionalism, which sees 
determinacy as always being a function of 
horizonally nested regions. The thought here 
is that the determinacy of being itself is 
ontologically regional, a function of 
dynamically changing sweeps across place 
(as well as temporality), rather than being 
something that could be given or rest in 
discrete locations within being. With 
Collingwood, we could say that being takes 
a minimum of space to be. But—and this is 
the difficult point—this is not a minimum of 
some already given space, it is a minimum 
of region engendered in the very being of 
being. Bergson would teach us that we have 
to wait for being to happen determinately, or 
better, that being has to wait to be. The 
thought here is something like: being has to 
wander to be. Becoming ander, wonder, 
questioning, and so on, have regional roots. 
And the condition of being wandering is 
being hollow, having endogenous latitude to 
wander.  
Third, we have found here various 
affinities between humans and other 
animals. We animals are all in the same 
boat, we all need to move, but we move our 
boats in different ways. Other nonhuman 
animals tend to have bodies and sensoria 
that, in whatever way, gear them finely to 
the sweep of regions. We humans, on the 
other hand, are weakly tuned to the 
determinacies of place and compensate by 
either cultivating memory of and sensitivity 
to regional intensities or, as it were, 
detaching ourselves from the overwhelming 
intensity of places to construct an ideal 
space amenable to what we are good at 
navigating. We have often distinguished 
ourselves from other animals by proclaiming 
ourselves the rational animal, and so on. In 
this way we conceptualize this difference as 
rooted in a capacity that is not animal at 
all—for example, in Cartesian mind as 
irreducible to animal body. Here we are 
going quite the other way: what describes 
our differences and continuities with other 
animals precisely springs from our animal 
capacity as weak. Our animal weakness, our 
being lost, inclines us to tell stories about 
how to get from here to there and to transmit 
them to our children or to invent 
abstractions that bypass this sort of 
weakness. If we can think that we are 
Cartesians, this is in fact because we are lost 
animals who have become Cartesians in 
order not to be lost. The Cartesian does not 
spring from a mind most unanimal; it is 
rather our way of being animal that 
generates Cartesian mind as a retrospective 
illusion. And our way of being animal need 
not lead merely in that direction; it can lead 
to quite a different kind of attunement to our 
surroundings.  
In other words, as Merleau-Ponty would 
put it, we are different from other animals 
precisely by way of our “strange kinship” 
with them.48 Attending to this kinship, as I 
have hoped to have shown can give us a 
different sense of our being, animal being, 
and the place of being itself. 
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